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The 2014 European Elections in Poland 
Are we in for another uninspiring campaign? 
Melchior Szczepanik 
In previous European elections, Polish political parties were not able to draw a large number 
of  voters  to  the  polling  stations.  Poland  stood  out  in  the  European  Union  mainly  by  its 
extremely low turnout. Given the current situation in the Polish political scene, the chances 
are that the 2014 electoral campaign will also be lacklustre, focused on domestic issues, 
resulting yet again in a disappointing turnout.  
Who wants to talk about Europe? 
Since  2005,  Polish  political  life  has  been  dominated  by  the  rivalry  between  the  liberal-
conservative Civic Platform (PO), in power since 2007, and Law and Justice (PiS), staunchly 
conservative on social issues and somewhat statist in economic matters. Over the years the 
rivalry  has  become  embittered,  with  acute  personal  animosities  between  leaders  of  both 
parties  often  overshadowing  programmatic  differences.  It  seems  that  another  electoral 
campaign revolving around a struggle between the two cannot but alienate voters. 
Law and Justice has been leading in the polls since spring 2013 and can be considered 
the favourite to win the European election. It is likely that the party will want to capitalise on 
the shrinking popularity of the prime minister and his government, and will therefore focus its 
campaign on domestic issues. Such a strategy will make it easier to attack its main rival and, 
at the same time, divert the electorate’s attention away from PiS’s modest achievements in the 
European Parliament (EP). Out of 15 MEPs elected as PiS candidates in 2009, only seven are 
still affiliated with the party.
1 MEPs played a prominent part in two splits that affected PiS in 
                                                   
1  Out  of  eight rebel  MEPs,  four  remained  members  of  the  political  group  of  European  Conservatives  and 
Reformists, to which PiS belonged since the beginning of the term, while four others joined the more eurosceptic 
Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group. 
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2010 and 2011 (the leaders of both parties created as a result of those splits are MEPs). The 
infighting may be one of the reasons why PiS MEPs, bar a few exceptions, cannot boast a 
large number of achievements in the chamber. Some of them are manifestly more interested 
in  domestic  politics;  others  struggle  to  make  a  significant  impact.  Their  mediocre 
performance is also due to the fact that PiS MEPs are members of a small political group – 
European Conservatives and Reformists – which, with only 56 members, can rarely influence 
the decisions shaped in negotiations between the largest political groups in the chamber.       
At first sight, Civic Platform should be more willing to bring EU-related issues to the 
forefront of its campaign. The party – together with its coalition partner, the agrarian Polish 
People’s Party – has a strong delegation in the EP’s largest political group and is thus much 
better positioned than its main domestic rival to influence the decision-making process. A 
number of PO MEPs (such as Jerzy Buzek and Danuta Hübner) have won praise both at home 
and in Brussels for their effective work in the chamber.  
However, one may fear that PO’s campaign may be less EU-centred than expected. 
After  a  series  of  setbacks  in  local  and  national  by-elections,  the  party  is  desperate  for  a 
success that could enable it to bounce back. Therefore, the party leadership may be tempted to 
field  popular  local  and  national  politicians  rather  than  former  MEPs  or  highly  qualified 
candidates who are often poorly known to the electorate. Rumours have recently surfaced that 
party  leaders will  be trying to discourage MEPs who are serving their second term  from 
seeking re-election. Such a move would most probably result in a more nationally-oriented 
campaign. The growing internal strife may be another factor that will limit PO’s capability to 
launch  a  dynamic  campaign.  The  leader  of  the  party’s  conservative  wing  recently  quit 
following an unsuccessful campaign, full of recriminations, to replace the prime minister, 
Donald Tusk, as party chairman. The  latter is  now facing a serious conflict with another 
influential party member, Grzegorz Schetyna, who used to be seen as Tusk’s successor. 
Surprisingly, even though a growing number of voters are manifestly fed up with the 
cutthroat struggle between – as well as within – the two major parties, nobody seems able to 
seize the opportunity. None of the two conservative parties, which were created following 
splits  in  PiS,  and  which  promised  a  less  aggressive  version  of  conservatism,  enjoys 
considerable support in the polls. The left-wing parties are also unlikely to improve their 
results compared to previous elections.
2 A new initiative called Europa+, launched in spring 
2013 by Aleksander Kwaśniewski, the former president of Poland, and Janusz Palikot, the 
leader of the newest left-wing party, suggested that the Left could unite for the European 
election.  Such  a  new  undertaking,  bringing  together  the  parties  and  some  well-known 
independent politicians, could arguably provide  a spark for a dynamic  and attractive pro-
European campaign. Yet the initiative has not taken off: it was rejected by the leader of the 
                                                   
2 The Democratic Left Alliance (Social Democrats) attracted the support of 12% of voters in the 2009 EP 
election and 8% in the 2011 national election. Meanwhile, the Palikot's Movement, set up in 2011, received 10% 
of the votes in the parliamentary election that year, campaigning on a liberal economic agenda and a progressive 
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Social  Democrats,  Leszek  Miller,  and  has  not  attracted  any  important  public  figures.  Its 
revival is highly improbable as both Kwaśniewski and Palikot have manifestly lost interest in 
it. Both  left-wing parties will  certainly try to highlight EU issues  in their campaigns and 
emphasise  the  benefits  of  integration,  ranging  from  freedom  of  movement  to  generous 
cohesion funds. However, with Palikot’s Movement still searching for its identity
3 and the 
Social Democrats clearly lacking ideas to attract a bigger following, one may doubt whether 
they will be able to stimulate interest and enthuse voters. 
Surprising convergence on EU issues 
Another,  less  manifest  reason  for  the  unlikelihood  that  the  electoral  campaign  will 
revolve around EU issues is a relatively small number of divergences between Polish parties 
in this domain. Interestingly, even though the two main political parties see the long-term 
relationship between Poland and the EU in different ways, they often agree when it comes to 
more immediate issues. PO wants to anchor Poland in the vanguard of integration, declares 
the  intention  to  introduce the  euro  sooner  rather than  later  and  advocates  closer  political 
integration. PiS, on the other hand, is wary of deeper integration and tends to question the 
benefits of some of the existing common policies. Despite those differences, members of both 
parties – together with Polish Social Democrats – display the same, or similar, views with 
regard to some important issues debated by the EP. Polish MEPs in unison voiced support for 
a big EU budget, extolled the virtues of cohesion policy and called for closer relations with 
the EU’s Eastern neighbours. They emphasised the benefits of a more integrated EU energy 
market and protested against potential EU regulations limiting the freedom of extraction of 
gas and oil from alternative sources (shale gas in particular). They were also unanimous in 
opposition  to  the  calls  for  the  EU  to  set  stricter  targets  regarding  climate  policy  (CO2 
emissions, use of renewables and the like). The main difference between Polish parties as 
regards the most pressing and widely debated problems is the attitude towards the reform of 
economic governance, with the PiS rejecting stricter control of national fiscal policies by EU 
institutions.  
Consequently, political parties, willing to distinguish themselves from their adversaries, 
may shy away from discussing EU issues and focus on style rather than substance. The PiS 
will attempt to portray the government as too soft and easily pushed around by European 
heavyweights in negotiations. The PO will react by showing Donald Tusk as a leader who is 
highly respected by the European partners and depicting the PiS as eurosceptics with few 
allies in Europe.  
 
 
                                                   
3 The party has recently changed its name to Your Movement to make it less leader-centred, but the leading 
figures seem undecided whether the party should become akin to classic Social Democracy ideas or rather to 
reconcile economic liberalism with a progressive stance on social issues.  4 | MELCHIOR SZCZEPANIK 
Conclusions 
Should the Left fail to come up with an imaginative campaign, the duel between PO and PiS 
will most likely be the central theme of yet another Polish election. The opposition will try to 
gain support by highlighting governmental shortcomings on the domestic front. The PO may 
be too preoccupied with internal strife to properly highlight their achievements in the EU 
arena. One may fear that both parties will treat the campaign as a test before a series of 
national elections
4 coming in the near future rather than as an opportunity to engage in serious 
debate about the future of the EU. A campaign that unfolds according to such a scenario will 
not attract a lot of public attention. This is a shame. Research shows that even though Poles 
support integration, they know very little about the EU and even less about the ways in which 
citizens can influence the decision-making process (many of them oblivious to the fact that 
MEPs are directly elected).
5 
A thorough electoral debate, focused on the main problems of the EU and alternative visions 
for the future, would not only convince citizens that casting a vote in the European elections 
matters, but also encourage them to make use of other mechanisms of public involvement. 
The only reason for optimism is that radical eurosceptics are extremely unlikely to win seats, 
as PiS holds sway among the nationalistically-inclined voters. As arduous as this task may 
seem, NGOs and the more respectable media must demand that parties pay due attention to 
the  major  problems  of  the  EU.  The  media  scrutiny  of  candidates  should  focus  on  the 
qualifications that will enable them to adapt well to the particular political environment that is 
the EP. 
                                                   
4 Local elections are scheduled in autumn 2014, while parliamentary and presidential elections will take place in 
2015.  
5 See, for example, Marek Dudkiewicz, Aleksander Fuksiewicz, Jacek Kucharczyk and Agnieszka Łada, The 
European  Parliament.  Social  trust  and  ignorance,  Institute  of  Public  Affairs,  Warsaw  2013  (available  at 
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